University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2007

Overcoming Dred: A Counterfactual Analysis
Louise Weinberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Weinberg, Louise, "Overcoming Dred: A Counterfactual Analysis" (2007). Constitutional Commentary. 653.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/653

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

OVERCOMING DRED: A
COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS
Louise Weinberg*

I. INTRODUCTION
1

Could anything have been done about Dred Scott in its own
day, in a Supreme Court remade by Abraham Lincoln? That is,
was Dred Scott vulnerable to overrule, even in its own day, even
in advance of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Would the power of then-existing constitutional theory have
been sufficient to support overcoming Dred? If the answer is yes,
we would have the key to the essential wrongness of Dred Scott,
quite apart from the usual critiques of Chief Justice Roger
Taney's opinion.
Analysis of this question is best performed in a counterfactual setting. By stripping away the aftermath of the election of
1860, the South's secession and the Civil War, and by examining
a Lincoln Supreme Court's likely options as rationally perceivable by voters in 1860, we can isolate for consideration the constitutional vulnerabilities of Dred Scott in the context of the national predicament at the time. We can examine the Court's
plausible alternatives, with some freedom from involuntary
anachronism and presentism.
We can reasonably assume that voters in 1860 were anticipating that the South would abide the election and accept Lincoln's presidency, in the ordinary peaceable way the Constitu*Holder of the Bates Chair and Professor of Law. The University of Texas at Austin.
Copyright © by Louise Weinberg 2007. This paper grew out of ~ork partly based on
talks I gave at the conference on Presidential Elections and the Supreme Court. held under the joint auspices of the University of California at Irvine and Whittier Law School
in 2004: at the Dred Scali Conference held at the University of Texas Law School in
2006: and at faculty colloquia at Georgia State University. th~ University of Texas. and
Saint Louis University. I would like to thank for the hospitality of their platforms Jack
Balkin. Eric Claeys. Neil Cogan. Eric Foner. Paul Finkelman. Sandv Levinson. Eric
Segall. Jordan Steiker. Bill Wiecek. and Jon Wiener.
·
I. Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (Taney. C.J.).
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tion provides that Americans undergo a transfer of power. Voters would anticipate that the South. through the Democratic
Party. would retain effective control of the Senate after the election. as. in fact. it did. Nobody in 1860 could have predicted the
Confiscation A~ts of 1861 and 1862,c the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863,' or the Thirteenth Amendment of 1865.~ So we
can clear all these events from our thinking and conduct our inquiry as if they never occurred. In order to focus more precisely
on overruling Dred Scott, we will eliminate related possibilities.
such as the possibility of the Court's sustaining an act of Congress providing for a compensated emancipation. Still. we could
not advance the inquiry if we took the Court as it was in 1860.
The "Chase Court," a ten-Justice Court with its full complement
of five Lincoln appointees, was complete only in 1864, and
lacked a Lincoln-appointed majority. Let us hypothesize, then,
for purposes of this analysis, a Chase Court with a majority
comprised of Lincoln appointees, coming into being early in the
1860s. and prepared to overrule Dred Scott at the earliest opportunity.
What can we gain from setting up this wholly counterfactual
inquiry. apart from the sheer intellectual fun of it? I have said
that with this inquiry we will be able to identify and articulate
the essential constitutional critique of Dred Scott, uncovering,
among Dred Scott's manifold wrongnesses. its core constitutional
infirmity. More specifically. we will also discover the true ground
on which to assess the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, struck down in Dred Scott-and indeed, all of the old
territorial "compromise" statutes. We will find that Dred Scott
was constitutionally infirm within the constitutional understandings of its own time and therefore might have been overruled
then. The Court arguably could have done this even if an overruling of Dred Scott would have been greeted with the kind of
disregard we have come to associate with the modern school
prayer cases, or with Worcester v. Georgia. 5 We will also begin to
2. See Act to Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, 12
Stat. 319 § 1 (Aug. 6, 1861) (providing for confiscation of fugitive slaves of rebel owners,
the slaves to be declared lawful prize in any federal district court sitting in admiralty); An
Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate
the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, ch. 195. 12 Stat. 589, 589-91, §§ 5, 7. 9
(July 17. 1862) (providing for confiscation of all property of disloyal persons, including
their slaves. in effect emancipating slaves that ran away to the Union armies).
3. Proclamation No. 17 (Jan. 1, 1863), republished, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865) (abolishing slavery in the United States and its
territories).
5. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (removing from state legislative authority the Indian
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see why the necessary analysis was not evoked, not considered,
not developed, not argued at the time, even by counsel in Dred
Scott, even by Dred Scott's dissenting Justices. But we shall also
see very good reasons for the silence of that generation. Among
the surprises our exploration has in store for us, we will come to
see, along with the benefits of overruling Dred Scott, the very
real difficulties that stood in the way at the time, and the ironies
that would have accompanied any such overruling.
II. THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DRED SCOTT
It is not always understood to what extent Dred Scott was at
the heart of the election of 1860 and the crisis that followed. In a
recent symposium on Dred Scott, I argued the centrality of the
case to those events." In making that claim I did not mean to be
understood as saying that Dred Scott was the only issue in the
election of Abraham Lincoln, or, as is often said, that Dred Scott
caused the Civil War. But it was a central issue in the election,
and at the eye of the sectional storm as the War came on.
I need only recount the main lines of that argument here. In
the 1850s, the sectional conflict over slavery was coming to a
7
head. With the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, Congress opened
the West to slavery, for the first time providing the option of
slavery to all territories, North as well as South of the old Missouri Compromise line.~ The status of the Western territoriesslave or free- would thenceforth be determined by vote of the
people of those territories. This was the beguiling theory of socalled "popular sovereignty." But in the wake of the KansasNebraska Act, "Bleeding Kansas" became the stage of a veritable rehearsal for the Civil War. And the Whi~ party, the party of
compromise, collapsed with the North-South coalition that had

tribes, specifically the Cherokee tribe in Georgia, and placing them under the exclusive
oversight of the nation). This is the case of which President Jackson is said to have remarked, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it."
6. Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97
(2007).
7. Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277.
8. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 545. The line was drawn at 36°-30' of latitude. Slavery was prohibited in territory north of the line, except for Missouri.
9. Throughout this paper, for convenience I sometimes ignore distinctions not important to my argument among and within sections of the country. I use such customary
terms as "the South," and "Southerners" to refer to white leaders, thinkers, or prevailing
white opinion in slave states. "The North" generally means "not the South," and includes, e.g .. the old Northwest Territory, the northerly sections of the old Louisiana Territory, and the Far West.
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sustained it. On both sides, increasing anger and extremism in
politics was exceeded only by the anger and extremism of the
press.
Historians generally agree that this conflict was not about
slavery simply, or about slavery in the South. but about slavery
in the territories. It is also understood that the dispute was not
about competing labor systems for the territories. but rather was
a scramble for territory itself. Moreover. the scramble for territory was not a struggle for land, but rather for national political
10
power. In my earlier paper I traced the economic. political, and
social roots of this power struggle.
In 1857, in Dred Scott, through a reactionary blunder of
monstrous proportions, the Taney Court attempted to put an
end to the conflict by coming down squarely on one side, endowing slave-owners with a fundamental constitutional right of property in their slaves. The Court held that Congress could not establish free territory, since to do so would destroy the property
rights of slave-owners traveling or settling there.
Chief Justice Taney found these substantive property
rights in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 11 This
sacralization of slave property, depending as it did on the Constitution, necessarily stripped Congress of authority to reach a
fresh political compromise of the issue tearing the country apart.
With Dred Scott, Congress lost its power of abolition. Yet the
Union had been able to survive until then largely because Congress could prohibit slavery in some territories as the price of
permitting slavery in others. James Madison thought that no
blame should attach to Congress in seeking to avoid disunion by
this means. 12 This sort of compromise had characterized the
whole course of legislation governing the territories from which
new states would be added to the Union. This was the bargain
struck over and over, from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 1'
10. This was understood at the time. See. e.g .. the respected Irish economist. JOHN
E. CAIRNES. THE SLA YE POWER: ITS CHARACfER. CAREER. AND PROBABLE DESIGNS
(2003) ( 1863). at 104 ("The desire to obtain fresh territory for the creation of slave states.
with a view to influence in the Senate. has carried the South in its career of aggression far
beyond the range which its mere industrial necessities would have prescribed.").
11. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 450; U.S. CONST. amend. V (1791) ("No person shall ...
be deprived of life. liberty. or property. without due process of law: nor shall private
property be taken for public use. without just compensation.").
12. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (NO\. 20. 1819). in IX THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (Gaillard Hunted .. 1910). at 1: Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Feb. 23. 1820). ibid .. at 23.
13. Act of Julv 13. 1787. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the
United States. Norih-West of the River Ohio. ch. 8. I Stat. 50. 51 (abolishing slavery in
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14

and the Missouri Compromise of 1820, through the Compro1
mise of 1850, 15 to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. " In declar17
ing the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, however, Dred
Scott, in effect, rendered all these old compromises unconstitutional. Congress could only permit slavery, never prohibit it. ~
With an obtuseness that still baffles the reader, the Dred Scott
Court thought to pacify the South by denying Congress power to
pacify the rest of the country. The Court imagined it could contain the conflict by denying Congress the power to contain it.
Let me pause briefly to acknowledge that a purist reader
might characterize the Court's ruling on the limits of the power
of Congress under the Fifth Amendment as mere obiter dictum,
casually offered only in passing. 1y In this view, Dred Scott simply
held that there could be no federal diversity jurisdiction in the
case, Scott being black, and therefore, according to Chief Justice
Taney, incapable of citizenship. But to suppose that Dred Scott
was about jurisdiction would be about as helpful as supposing
that Marbury v. Madison was about jurisdiction. co The issue roil1

the old Northwest Territory: tacitly isolating slavery in the South).
14. Act of Mar. 6. 1820. ch. 22. § 8. 3 Stat. 545 (dealing with the Louisiana Purchase:
closing to slavery territory north of 36c -30' of latitude. except for Missouri: opening to
slavery Missouri and territory to the south of the Compromise line).
15. Act of Sept. 9. 1850. ch. 49. 9 Stat. 446: Act of Sept. 9. 1850. ch. 51. 9 Stat. 453.
The Compromise of 1850 brought California into the Union directly as a free state without regard to the Compromise line. but opened the New Mexico and Utah territories to
the option of slavery. Later. as part of the Compromise. Congress also enacted a new.
more draconian fugitive slave law. Act of Sept. 18. 1850. ch. 60. 9 Stat. 462 (amending the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793), repealed. Act of June 28. 1864. ch. 166. 13 Stat. 200. As part
of the Compromise of 1850. Congress also prohibited the slave trade in the District of
Columbia. Act of Sept. 20. 1850. ch. 63. 9 Stat. 467.
16. Act of May 30. 1854. ch. 59. 10 Stat. 277. With the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Congress abandoned responsibility for determining the status. slave or free. of the remaining
territories. relegating that responsibility instead to the affected populations.
17. The Missouri Compromise line had been repealed. in effect. by the KansasNebraska Act's provision of so-called "popular sovereignty." What the Dred Scott Court
struck down was the Missouri Compromise as it stood at the time of Scott's sojourn on
free territory.
18. Even the Kansas-Nebraska Act's expedient of "popular sovereignty" was specifically ruled unconstitutional in Dred Scott: "And if Congress itself cannot do this-if it
is beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government-it will be admitted. we presume. that it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise them." Dred Scott,
60 U.S. at 451.
19. This is a commonplace view. Commentators point out that Chief Justice Tanev
devoted too little space to the due process argument to justify a reading of the case be·yond its jurisdictional holding. See, e.g.. DON E. FEHRENBACHER. THE DRED SCO'IT
CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978). at 352: James W. Elv.
Jr .. The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive D1;e
Process, 16 CONST. C0~1MENT. 315. 3JS (1999).
20. Cf. Louise Weinberg. Our Marbury. 89 VA. L. REV. 1235. 1296. 1341 (2003).
The jurisdictional ruling in Dred Scali was all nonsense. of course. Chief Justice Taney
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ing the country, which the Court had undertaken to settle, was
not about the availability of federal courts to black persons, but
was about the extension of slavery into the remaining territories
of the United States.
Of course, Dred Scott was deeply satisfying to Southerners.
After Dred Scott, neither Congress nor its delegate, a territorial
legislature, could constitutionally prohibit slavery in the particu1
lar territory.' And, just as the Fifth Amendment protected slave
property from deprivation by Congress, it might even protect
slave property from deprivation by a state, notwithstanding the
Fifth Amendment's inapplicability to the states. The original
thirteen colonies came into being as "states" when the nation
did. in 1776. But the newer states were creatures of Congress, as
were the territories from which they emerged, and thus might be
held to be Congress's delegates too. Abraham Lincoln feared
that with just one more case the Court would strip the states of
power to abolish slavery within their own borders.'2 True, this
last possibility was unlikely. The states created by Congress generally were assumed, under the applicable statutes, to enjoy
"equal footing" with the original thirteen states, 2' and therefore
to have the same power to opt for or against slavery, once statehood was achieved, as the original thirteen possessed. And the
Fifth Amendment, as interpreted in Dred Scott, would obviously
protect slave property from deprivation by Congress in a state as
well as in a territory, whether that state were one of the original
thirteen or not.
The trouble, to Southern leaders, was that Dred Scott appeared to be threatened. Not by constitutional amendment-the
South was protected against constitutional amendments. With
equal representation in the Senate, Southern states could always
seemed to read the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction as if it required federal rather
than state citizenship, compounding confusion by ruling that federal citizenship was a
condition of access to federal courts. But there are no prominent heads of federal juris·
diction that require U.S. citizenship. Perhaps to overcome this objection, Taney argued
that access to federal courts was a "privilege or immunity" of national citizenship. But at
the time the only privileges and immunities in the Constitution were privileges of state,
not national, citizenship. U.S. CONST. art IV, §1.
21. For Taney's language, see supra note 18, Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 451.
22. Abraham Lincoln, Speech Delivered at Springfield, Illinois ("A House Divided"] (Jun. 16, 1858), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, COMPLETE WORKS (in two volumes)
(John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1902) (1894), vol. I, at 241, 244 ("Put this and that
together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with
another Supreme Court decision declaring that the Constitution of the United States
does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits.").
23. See, e.g., Missouri Compromise of 1820, § 1 (Missouri Enabling Acts) (Mar. 6,
1820). ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545 (providing for "equal footing" for the new state of Missouri).
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block a constitutional amendment: the supermajorities required
for constitutional amendments by Article V could be achieved
by no anti-South coalition. Even after the election of 1860, the
Democrats, who had lost the House of Representatives in 1858,
still retained control of the Senate in the lame-duck 36th Congress,2~ as it almost always had since 1789. And the South "had''
the Supreme Court.
But Southerners feared devastating developments from another source. During the celebrated 1858 debates between Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas. when the two were contending for
a seat in the Senate, Douglas made a remark at Freeport, Illinois,2' a remark that was undermining Southern confidence in
Dred Scott. Building on the much-quoted language in Somerset's
Case. in which Lord Mansfield had declared, "Slavery is so odi2
ous that nothing can support it but positive law, " " Douglas took
the position that a territory could defeat Dred Scott simply by
failing to enact law creating, supporting. and enforcing rights of
property in slaves. 2'
24. In the Senate. in the lame-duck 36th Congress. 2d Session. after the admission
of Kansas as the 34th state on January 29. 1861. 68 seats were available. The Democrats
had 38 of these. (The Republicans had 26. the American Party two. and the two Kansas
seats were not yet filled.) The Democrats might have retained control even of the postsecession Senate in the 37th Congress. had their Senators remained in Washington in
sufficient numbers to defeat the admission of Kansas in the previous Congress. In the
Senate in the 37th Congress. first convened July 4. 1861. there were 31 Republicans (including the two from Kansas) plus three Unionists: the remaining 34 seats were held by
Democrats or were vacant. the vacancies in seats abandoned by Southerners. In the
House. in the lame duck 36th Congress. 2d Session. the Democrats, having lost control in
1858. could outvote the Republicans only if they could achieve coalition with other nonRepublican parties. (The house had 116 Republicans, and 122 in all other parties.) Here.
the South's absence during the vote to admit Kansas did not clearly hurt the South: Kansas was admitted with only one representative. In the 37th Congress, the Republicans
were a plurality in the House, but in coalition with the Unionists had a clear majority.
The House was still apportioned under the old census of 1850, and 239 seats were available. Republicans and Unionists of various factions held 140 seats, leaving only 99 for all
other parties. KENNETH C. MARTIS, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1989); KENNETH C. MARTIS, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF
U:\ITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (1982). For recent discussion of the changing composition of Congress as secessionists cleared out, and the resultant strains on
Congress. see John Bryan Williams, How to Survive a Terrorist Attack: The Constitution's
Majority Quorum Requirement and the Continuity of Congress, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1025 (2006). See, for the work and radicalization of the 37th Congress in the absence of
Southern members. David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131
(2006).
25. Stephen A. Douglas. Reply to Lincoln in the Freeport Debate (Aug. 27, 1858),
in THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1991)
(1958), at 152 ("[S]lavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere. unless it is supported
by local police regulations ... ").
26. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (KB 1772).
27. Douglas, Reply to Lincoln. supra note 25.
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Southern leaders were determined to shore up Dred Scott
against Douglas's "Freeport Doctrine," and to extend more explicitly the protection of Dred Scott over the entire nation as well
as the territories. At the convention of the Democratic party in
Charleston in 1860, Southern "Fire-Eaters" confrontationally
called for a plank in the party platform demanding that Congress
enact a nationwide slave code. 28 The convention's rejection of
this extremist demand broke up the fragile old North-South
Democratic coalition on the spot. Delegates from eight Southern
states bolted the convention. This split in the Democratic Party,
perversely. made a Republican victory in 1860 almost inevitable.'y
Southerners also feared a more direct challenge to Dred
Scott. If Abraham Lincoln, the candidate of the new Republican
Party, won the forthcoming election, he might well be able to
transform the Supreme Court, and get Dred Scott overruled. After all, Andrew Jackson, that hero of the South, had transformed
the Court. Jackson had nominated five Justices, including Chief
30
Justice Roger Taney, and three of them were still serving on
1
the Court that decided Dred Scott.' To be sure, a Jackson appointee, Justice McLean, dissented in Dred Scott. Nevertheless,
it was felt that Jackson had succeeded in completing the antiFederalist work of his predecessors, and had created the Taney
Court. With Dred Scott, the South-leaning, pro-slavery propensities of the Taney Court were only just becoming fully apparent.
Now this new man, Abraham Lincoln, this dark-horse presidential candidate, this "black Republican,'' was adamantly opposing
28. This faction achieved its aims in the platform produced at the June 11. 1860.
convention of the Democratic Party's Deep South [Breckinridge] faction in Richmond.
Va. See NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1968 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald B. Johnson. eds. 1972). at 31. paras. 2. 3.
29. For a chronology of the events leading to what became a three-way split in the
Democratic Partv in 1860. see Weinberg. Dred Scott. supra note 6, at 122-33.
30. In 1833. in his notorious war on the Bank of the United States. Jackson appointed Roger Taney. at the time his Attorney General. as Secretary of the Treasury to
replace Secretary William J. Duane. who replaced Secretary Louis McLane. neither of
whom would carry out Jackson's imbecile order to remove the federal deposits from the
Bank. Alone in Jackson's cabinet. only Taney was willing to carry out the order. Jackson's attempt to reward Taney with an Associate Justiceship on the Supreme Court was
rebuffed by an outraged Senate. but after the death of John Marshall and a Democratic
Party sweep in the election of 1836. Jackson, though a lame duck. was able to put Taney
into the Chief Justiceship. See ROBERT V. REMJNI. ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK
WAR ( 1967). For a contemporaneous account. see T. F. GORDON. THE WAR ON THE
BA:-;KOFTHE UNJTEDSTATES(1834).
31. Still serving in 1857 were Chief Justice Roger Taney and Justices John McLean
and James M. Wayne. Jackson's other appointees. Justices Henry Baldwin and PhilipP.
Barbour. died in the 18-IOs.
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the further territorial spread of slavery, and inveighing against
Dred Scott at every opportunity.
Lincoln was outraged by Dred Scott. In his bid for the Senate, in his celebrated debates with Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln
must have seemed to be running not so much against Douglas as
against Dred Scott. 32 His attacks on the case continued after his
loss to Douglas. Lincoln attacked Dred Scott in his great speech
at Cooper Union." As presidential candidate he was still running
against Dred Scott; Lincoln ran on a Republican Party platform
34
opposing Dred Scott in not one, but four planks. He was still attacking the case after the election, insisting in his First Inaugural
Address that Dred Scott was only an ordinary litigation between
private parties, and that, although binding between the parties,
the Supreme Court's judgment in a private dispute should not be
allowed to set national policy- that no public official should feel
bound by such a judgment.'' It was, precisely, to oppose the
spread of slavery into the more northerly territories, a possibility
opened up for the first time in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854,
that Lincoln had come out of political retirement. It was in the
same interest that Lincoln's party-the new Republican Partyhad come together."' Southerners could reasonably fear the kind
of Supreme Court Justices such a President would appoint. As
Stephen A. Douglas argued, "Mr. Lincoln intimates that there is
another mode by which he can reverse the Dred Scott decision.
How is that? Why, he is going to appeal to the people to elect a
President who will appoint judges who will reverse the Dred
17
Scott decision."
32. See COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES. supra note 25. at 4-7.28-29.3637.70.77-79.120.128-29.217-18.309-11.333.335.337-38.394.
33. See Lincoln. Address at Cooper Institute. New York (Feb. 20. 1860). in I
COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 599. 600-07.
34. See Republican Platform of 1860. para. 2. in NATIO~AL PARTY PLATFORMS.
supra note 28. at 32 (calling attention to the language of the Declaration of Independence that '"all men are created equal""): para. 5 (deploring ··the intervention of Congress
and of the Federal Courts of the extreme pretensions of a purely local interest .... "):
para. 7 (denouncing '"the new dogma that the Constitution ... carries slavery into any or
all of the territories of the United States" as ··a dangerous political heresy"): para. 8 (declaring the determination of Republicans to oppose the Taney Court's interpretation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
35. Lincoln. First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4. 1861 ). in II Cm.IPLETE WORKS. supra
note 22. at 5.
36. In the election of 1856. the Republican party fielded its first presidential the
election of 1856. candidate. John C. Fremont of California. a soldier. inventor. explorer.
and a bit of a character. The party slogan was ··Free soil. free men. Fremont."
37. Stephen A. Douglas. Speech at Springfield. Illinois (July 17. 1858). in
COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES. supra note 25. at 43. 57: cf Abraham Lincoln. Speech in Reply to Senator Douglas. delivered at Chicago (July 10. 1858). in I
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The election of 1860, then, was to some extent a referendum
on Dred Scott. It is tempting to liken the case to Roe v. Wade in
our own time. But Dred Scott was about deep power politics, and
the controversy with which it dealt divided the country geographically. Polarizing as Roe has seemed, it will not lead to war
between the states.
On the other hand, we need to remember that an overruling
of Dred Scott would not resolve the sectional conflict. Depending on the ground of decision. an overruling of Dred Scott might
permit courts to apply a rule of liberty once more to so-called
"sojourners'' -slaves that had been taken voluntarily into free
territory and had sojourned there for a time. 1H However, the evidence of the Dred Scott controversy itself is that few Southern
courts might remain willing to avail themselves of the opportunity,19 and the question arose infrequently in Northern courts. At
best, depending on the ground of decision, an overruling of Dred
Scott might restore power to Congress to try to reach some new
political "compromise" between North and South on the burning issue of slavery in the territories. Yet it seems unlikely that
any fresh compromise could be had. The chance of compromise
was over by the time of the election of 1860, although some who
understood the seriousness of the crisis but failed to understand
the futility of the effort still struggled to find some modus
vivendi. With Southern Democrats demanding national legal
protection for slavery,-!(' and the Republicans opposing the extension of slavery into the territories under anx circumstances, the
conflict had indeed become "irrepressible," 1 or, more precisely,
irreconcilable. All last-minute efforts at compromise were fail-

C0\1PLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 247.
3H. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
39. See Scott v. Emerson. 15 Mo. 576 (1852) (in earlier litigation by Scott in the
Missouri state courts. reversing the judgment of the trial court. which had followed the
rule of liberty. "once free. always free" -the rule until then applied in Missouri and other
Southern states: declaring that Missouri would no longer extend comity to the laws of
free states or territories): cf. Dred Scoll. 60 U.S. at 560-61 (McLean. J.. dissenting) (referring to the rule "once free. and always free" as a rule in the courts of Maryland. a border
slave state. while erroneously supposing that the rule of liberty was the law in no Southern court).
40. See Democratic Platform (Breckinridge Faction]. para. 2. in NATIONAL PARTY
PLATFORMS. supra note 28. at 31 ("[I]t is the duty of the Federal Government. in all its
departments. to protect. when necessary. the rights of persons and property in the Territories. and wherever else its constitutional authority extends.").
41. William Henry Seward. Speech. The Irrepressible Conflict (Oct. 25. 1858). in IV
THE WORKS OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 1853-84 (George E. Baker ed .. 1855). at 289. 292.
echoing Lincoln in his ··A House Divided" speech. in I COMPLETE WORKS. supra note
22. at 240.
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ing. "Entertain no proposition for a compromise," Lincoln admonished a Republican member of Congress. "in regard to the
extension of slavery. The instant you do, they have us under
again; all our labor is lost, and sooner or later must be done
42
over. ... The tug has to come and better now than later. "
Southerners not given to complex constitutional analysis
might well have feared an overruling of Dred Scott should Lincoln win, whatever difficulties in accomplishing an overruling
our own analysis will reveal. The fear would have been real
enough. Had the South remained in the Union to witness an
overruling of Dred Scott, the balm administered to Southerners
by Dred Scott- the moral force of constitutional protectionwould have been scrubbed away. The acute wounds of moral
opprobrium inevitably would have become much harder for
Southerners to bear. Congress's power over the status of the territories would be restored, whether or not Congress chose to exercise it. Worst of all, Southerners would have believed that,
stripped of power to groom enough new slave states for admission to the Union, the South would be left without sufficient
strength to extricate itself from its continuing loss of political
muscle in Congress. This, with the fact of a Lincoln victory itself,
would have suggested to Southern leaders a permanent loss of
the presidency; more, it would have meant to them the end of
the Southern ascendancy-an invitation to secede from the Union.
III. NARROWING THE QUESTION
As it fell out, Lincoln was never able to create a Supreme
Court majority, despite the ten-Justice Court afforded him by
Congress. All together he had the naming of four Associate JusticeS,43 and, eventually, a new Chief Justice, his Secretary of the
Treasury, Samuel P. Chase. With the war going badly and his
administration under fire, Lincoln chose Associate Justices who
were moderately conservative Union men-including the Democrat, Stephen J. Field- not at all the extremists the South had
feared. But in advance of the election these moderate appointments could not have been predicted.
42.

Reply to a Letter from William Kellogg. M.C.. Asking Advice (Dec. 11. 1860).

in I COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 658.

43. Lincoln named Associate Justices Noah H. Swavne. Samuel F. Miller. David
Davis. and. to fill the new tenth seat Congress gave him. Stephen J. Field. a Democrat.
All were strong Unionists.
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In advance of the election, what might pro-slavery voters
fear. and anti-slavery voters hope, that a Lincoln Supreme Court
would do about Dred Scott? What were the general understandings at the time? Even if voters could anticipate that Lincoln's
Supreme Court would build its jurisprudence conservatively on
the jurisprudence of its predecessors, as indeed it did, 44 they
could hardly assume that, if given an opportunity to narrow or
overrule Dred Scott, Justices selected by Abraham Lincoln
would decline the chance. What were the options open to a future Supreme Court fashioned by Abraham Lincoln?
A Lincoln Court might be expected to confront. if not slavery, then at least the Dred Scott case, and to overrule it. The
Court might be faced with a case, for example, brought on behalf
of a slave taken voluntarily into territory free under one of the
old compromises, and, on her return to the South, suing for
freedom in the courts of the domiciliary state, relying on the act
of Congress effecting the relevant compromise-thus directly
challenging Dred Scott. The Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review the judgment below on writ of error, since, whichever way the judgment went in the court below, the petitioner
40
challenging that judgment would be relying on federallaW -the
plaintiff below on the act of Congress, the defendant on the Fifth
Amendment.
But on what rationale could the Court overrule Dred Scott?
We can say unequivocally at the outset that in the 1860s, in a
case overruling Dred Scott, our hypothetical Supreme Court
would have to confront the Fifth Amendment holding at the
heart of Dred Scott. That is because the Fifth Amendment would
continue to stand in the way of congressional power revived on
any other ground. For this reason, such features of the case as,
for example, Chief Justice Taney's racism, can furnish only buttressing arguments. Such arguments can address Dred Scott's
holdings on jurisdiction and citizenship. But they cannot address
the key sectional dispute over the territorial extension of slavery
and over the power of Congress to deal with it.
The Fifth Amendment, then, would have to be reinterpreted. But an acute problem presents itself immediately. Any
such shattering of Dred Scott's protection for slavery would not
only stifle the South's hopes for new slave territory, but also re44. See e.g.. Mark Graber. The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism. 1 J. S.
CT. HIST. 17 (2000) (with statistics).
45. First Judiciary Act of 1789. § 25. 1 Stat 73.
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store the old feared inchoate power of Congress or the courts to
abolish slavery in the nation some day. Would not the overrule
of Dred Scott trigger the very secession that, in our hypotheticaL
has not occurred, with the same danger that the border states
would go as well? We cannot proceed to our inquiry if this serious political consideration bars the way at the outset. And so we
must assume that our hypothetical Supreme Court would not let
this political consideration stand in its way, any more than consideration of serious political consequences stood in the Court's
way in deciding Dred Scott.
We can proceed then to the possibility of the Court's overruling Dred Scott with a reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment. But on what theory? It is a most interesting inquiry. No
constitutional theory seemed to present itself in the antebellum
period. I offer a theory shortly,"" one apparently glimpsed at the
time and even asserted with some frequency, but-for understandable reasons-not put forward in any fully developed way.
In thinking about the possible options available to a hypothetical Lincoln Court in dealing with Dred Scott, there seem to
be three possibilities worth discussing.
IV. ONE THEORY: "SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS"
When critics of Dred Scott concern themselves with the
Fifth Amendment issue, at least ever since Edward Corwin's
47
progressive-era critique of the case, they tend to focus on Dred
Scott's "'substantive due process" reasoning, either to deplore or
defend it on abstract theoretical grounds, sometimes concealing
a political intention."' In theory, our hypothetical Supreme Court
in the 1860s might take the path of reinterpreting the Due Process Clause as purely procedural-as incapable of vindicating
substantive rights.
I would suggest that there are two main understandings of
"'substantive due process" today, as I glean them from tradition,
cases, and commentary. The first understanding is that a law vio46. See infra Part VI.
47. Edward S. Corwin. The Dred Scort Decision in Light of Conremporary Legal
Doctrines, 17 AM. H!ST. REV. 52. 53-59 ( !911 ).
4K See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson. Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred
Scott. ll2 CH!.-KE!':T L. REV. 49. 73-76 (2007) (arguing that Roger Taney's substantive
due process was both traditional and. as applied. wrong): Paul Finkelman. Scott v. Sandford: The Court's Most Dreadfid Case and How It Changed History. 82 CHI.-KENT L.
RE\'. 3. 10-11 (2007) (arguing that in view of valued unenumerated rights emerging in the
wake of Lochner. criticism of Dred Scott's substantive due process is wearing thin).
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lates the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments when it trenches on a "fundamental right" -that
is. a right enumerated in the Bill of Rights, or an unenumerated
right so important that no amount of notice or hearing, postdeprivation or pre-deprivation, can insulate the violation from
strict judicial review. The second substantive due process theory
posits that a law allegedly injurious to the interests of the plaintiff may be so arbitrary, irrational, confiscatory, or discriminatory as not to be law at all- not law that can be applied as the
process that is due. ~ This entitles the plaintiff to meaningful judicial review. In this latter understanding, I would suggest that
substance is transformed into procedure. In such cases, law is
deemed so unreasonable as to be unworthy of application within
the adjudicatory process. Fairness in adjudication requires reasonable law. The thinking is that reasonable law is part of the
process that is due.
It is not clear to me which of these two approaches was
Chief Justice Taney's in Dred Scott. On the one hand, he was
concerned with vested rights in property. On the other, he was
concerned with an arbitrary and discriminatory confiscation:
4

And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United
States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the
United States, and who had committed no offence against the
laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process
50
of law.

Critics of substantive due process insist, reasonably if literalistically, that process refers to procedure, not substance. They
therefore regard substantive due process as an oxymoron in any
context. They have not considered the above-described interesting phenomenon of substance transformed into procedure.
As for the "'fundamental rights" strand of substantive due
process, critics of the concept tend to argue, apparently to satisfy
personal political preferences, that substantive due process is judicial lawmaking at its most activist, allowing an uncontrollable
judiciary to create rights where the Constitution does not. This
49. For the closely related argument that due process is a limit on law chosen
through a method disregardful of the content and policy of the chosen law, see Louise
Weinberg. Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws. 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631. 1634-70 (2005);
Louise Weinberg. Back to the Future: The New General Common Law. in Symposium. 35
J. MAR. L. & COMM. 523 (2004): Louise Weinberg. Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny.
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440-88 (1982).
50. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 450.
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fretting over new rights puts the critics of substantive due process in the uncomfortable, indeed un-American, position of insisting that the Bill of Rights places a ceiling upon, rather than a
floor beneath, constitutional rights. Their view is contrary to
James Madison's view, and contrary to the explicit rule of construction given in the Ninth Amendment, that the enumeration
of rights is not to be read as an exclusion of unenumerated
rights. This consideration might create a difficulty for a Court
seeking to overrule Dred Scott in reaction to its substantive due
process reasoning.
Even if objections to unenumerated rights were consonant
with basic constitutional understandings, such objections would
suffer from their concentration in twentieth century controversies. The whole line of argument gives off too potent a whiff of
the struggles of the century just past to permit its confident pro1
jection onto the jurisprudence of the antebellum period.' As
everybody knows, in the last quarter of the twentieth century
"substantive due process" was the bugaboo of social conservatives outraged by Roe v. Wade." They liked to tar Roe with the
Dred Scott brush. In the previous wave of such criticisms, in the
1930s, substantive due process was the whipping-boy of the left.
The unacceptable case in those pre-Roe days was Lochner,'' the
bad old case stripping the states of power, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to improve the conditions of labor. Today's conservatives often liken Roe to Lochner
54
as well as to Dred, to demonstrate the awfulness of Roe. In
view of the fount of rights that Lochner was to become, today's
liberals are increasingly rallying to Lochner's defense."
51. Cf James Ely, The Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra note 19. at 319 (arguing that
substantive due process was not distinguished from procedural due process in the antebellum period and that to criticize antebellum substantive due process on grounds found
today would be anachronistic).
52. 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (finding a constitutional right to abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy. and a modified such right in the second). Women's abortion rights and
government powers over them have evolved since Roe and are subject to a different
analysis. See Gonzales v. Carhart. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007): Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
53. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. striking down New York State's maximum 10-hour day for
bakers. on the theory that the regulation impermissibly deprived both employees and
employers of the "liberty of contract" without due process of law).
54. See e.g. ROBERT H. BORK. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW ( 1990). at 44.
55. See supra note 48. Cf, Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390. 399 (1923) (relying on
Lochner; recognizing familial. contractual. and other unenumerated rights of substantive
due process); Louise Weinberg. Of Sovereignty and Union: The Leg~ends of Alden. 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113. 1130 n.77 (2001) (arguing that Lochner was correct about
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This kind of political sparring over substantive due process
was not a significant feature of constitutional theory in the 1860s
or in the antebellum period. Even if we could, or would. strip the
Due Process Clause of all substantive meaning today. we cannot
say that most antebellum lawyers who thought Dred Scott a bad
thing, thought it a bad thing because of its substantive due process reasoning. Neither Justice Curtis nor Justice McLean, dissenting in Dred Scott, had any quarrel with Taney's substantive
due process theory as such, respectively arguing only that no due
process deprivation occurs when property is transported to a
place at which such property is not recognized in law.'"
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the procedural
view of the Due Process Clause would become the apparent
view of the Chase Court in its closing days in 1873. in The
7
Slaughter-House Cases.' The discussion of the meaning of due
process in Slaughter-House, however. was negligible. and the
Court did not squarely come out and say that the Clause was
limited to procedure. It simply rejected one substantive due
process reading on the facts of that case. Moreover, three of Lincoln's Justices dissented in Slaughter-House, and each agreed
with a "'fundamental rights" theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, although, concededly, they relied on the Privileges and
Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause."' But it
seems unlikely, on the evidence of Slaughter-House, that our
an individual right to contract. certainly as to one's labor. as the Thirteenth Amendment
makes clear: adding that the fault of Lochner lay in its fatuity in not understanding the
effect on a contract of unequal bargaining power). See to similar effect. LAURE1'CE
TRIBE. AMERICA:-/ CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed .. 2000). at 1371 (faulting Lochner for
insensitivity to unequal bargaining power: stopping short of recognizing the positive constitutional value of .. libertv of contract .. ).
56. Dred Scou. 60 U.S. at 533-34 (McLean. 1.. dissenting): id. at 626-27 (Curtis. 1..
dissenting): Balkin & Levinson. Thirteen Ways. supra note 48.
) 1
The Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. ( 16 Wall.) ( 1873) (holding that the reference to .. citizens of the United States .. in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is fatal to applying that Clause to the civil rights of citizens of a
state: that civil rights must remain the province of the state because the Fourteenth
Amendment could not have been intended to reverse settled understandings of the respective powers of the states and nation over civil rights within a state: ;nd that the
Equal Protection Clause is largely limited to claims by black persons.)
58. The three Lincoln appointees dissenting in Slaughter-House were Chief Justice
Chase and Justices Swayne and Field. Chase and Swayne joined Field's dissent. Chase
was too ill to submit a separate opinion. but Swayne did so. Swayne's opinion made a
footnote reference to Bushrod Washington's oft-cited list of Article IV privileges and
immunities of state citizenship in Corfield v. Coryell. Slaughter-House. 83 U.S. at 128.
Field's dissent argued that the Fourteenth Amendment extends the Article IV privileges
and immunities of state citizenship to all United States citizens within the state as well as
those outside the state coming into it. /d. at 95-96 (Field. J.. dissenting). Justice Bradley.
who also dissented. was a Grant appointee.
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idealized Chase Court would have considered overruling Dred
Scott on a ''procedure only'' reading of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. This remains so even though Justice Davis
joined Justice Miller's opinion for the Slaughter-House Courtboth of them Lincoln appointees.
The real significance of Slaughter-House, ironically, is that it
is responsible for today's substantive due process. After Slaughter-House's demolition of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as a repository of fundamental
rights against the states, our rights against the states- the Bill of
Rights, and our unenumerated rights-had nowhere else to go.
Virtually all of our constitutional rights against state and local
government have had to be lodged in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. But for Slaughter-House, all of our
fundamental rights as against the states would be comfortably
ensconced in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. So we know in hindsight that an overruling
of Dred Scott on grounds rejecting substantive due process could
not have been built on any lasting foundation. The very longevity of Slaughter-House's hollow Privileges and Immunities
Clause renders substantive due process a practical necessity, if
the enumerated rights. or any other fundamental rights, are to
be protected against abridgement by local government.
In our time. certainly, it is too late to impute a thoroughgoing illegitimacy to substantive due process. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now "incorporates" vir59
tually every substantive right in the Bill of Rights. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his day, attempted with incomplete success to confine the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
60
procedural faults only, when a bare deprivation is alleged. But
he did not attempt to do so when an incorporated substantive

59. Two enumerated procedural rights remain ··unincorporated""-the Fifth
Amendment right to indictment by grand jury. and the Seventh Amendment right to civil
trial by jury. The substantive Second Amendment '"right to keep and bear Arms•· remains unincorporated as well. as does the Third Amendment right. now in desuetude.
against quartering of soldiers. Acknowledged unenumerated rights are equally operative
under the Due Process Clauses of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
60. Compare. e.g.. Zinermon v. Burch. 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (holding. over a dissent
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. that procedural due process was not accorded. where
the plaintiff had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution without a precommitment hearing as required by local law. notwithstanding the availability of a postdepnvatwn remedy in tort). with Daniels v. Williams. 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (Rehnquist.
C.J.) (holdmg that when government negligence may be remedied by a post-occurrence
actwn m tort. the tort is not a violation of the Due Process Clause).
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right was at issue, or even when an implied "fundamental right"
01
was at issue, as in cases under Roe v. Wade.
Dred Scott was and remains our worst case, not because
Chief Justice Taney's substantive due process reasoning was
oxymoronic, but because Dred Scott stripped Congress of power.
laying the country open to slavery and preventing Congress from
doing anything about it-preventing Congress from compromising the dispute that was drawing the country into the catastrophe
of civil war. A critique of substantive due process could hardly
do the whole job of overruling Dred Scott. A Court seeking to
overrule Dred Scott would need to confront Dred Scott's Fifth
Amendment with much heavier guns.
V. ANOTHER THEORY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING OF ''PROPERTY"
A better basis for an overruling of Dred Scott might have
been presented by a redefinition of the word "property" in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Of course, the Supreme Court could not bind the states to its view of property as a
matter of state law. Even in those days when the Court generally
was not bound to follow state case law where it applied, 62 the
states were certainly not bound to follow the Supreme Court's
63
lead as to matters of state law. But the Court could authoritatively redefine ''property" as that word is used in the Fifth
Amendment.
In his 1858 debates with Douglas, Lincoln said that Chief
Justice Taney's essential mistake of constitutional interpretation
in Dred Scott lay in the assertion that "the right of property in a
slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution." 64

61. Cf. Daniels. 474 U.S. at 336 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (pointing
out that there are three different kinds of Fourteenth Amendment due process: First,
"incorporating" rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights: second, incorporating unenumerated rights and rights to be free of arbitrary law; and, third, protecting under the bare
Due Process Clause rights to fair procedures).
62. Cf. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). overruled. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
u.s. 64 (1938).
63. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (Brandeis. J.) (noting the persistence of state courts in applying their own laws on questions of common law). Brandeis's observation points up the
fact that the common law available in federal courts under Swift had never been federalized, and thus was not the "supreme" law of the land. It simply represented an independ·
ent judgment of what state law ought to be, and as such was not binding on the state
judges.
64. Abraham Lincoln. Reply in the Galesburg Joint Debate (Oct. 7. 1858), in I
COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 437. 445.
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Lincoln firmly contradicted any such assertion as ''not true in
fact. " 65 A strong Lincoln Court might well reinterpret the meaning of the word "property" in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. There is a brief passage in Aves' Cas eM that
suggests the possibility of such a reinterpretation. Aves' Case is a
celebrated Massachusetts opinion by Chief Justice Shaw, influential for the seminal distinction it drew, crucial to antebellum
thought, between fugitives escaping from slave territory and
slaves voluntarily brought into free territory. Fugitives were to
be rendered up to their masters under the Fugitive Slave
Clause" -part of the sacred constitutional bargain."" Even slaves
brought voluntarily into a free state were to be rendered up, if
they were only in transit there. But those brought voluntarily
into a free state, sojourning there for a period of time, were not
within the terms of the sacred bargain. "Sojourners'' could become free."" In the course of discovering this distinction, through
a prolonged struggle, Chief Justice Shaw briefly, in passing, suggested the more fundamental point that there could be no property in human beings. Here is Lemuel Shaw wrestling with this
insight:
But it is not speaking with strict accuracy to say, that a property can be acquired in human beings, by local laws. Each
state may, for its own convenience, declare that slaves shall be
deemed property, and that the relations and laws of personal
chattels shall be deemed to apply to them; as, for instance,
that they may be bought and sold, delivered, attached, levied

65. /d. at 446.
66. Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. 193, 219 (1836) (Shaw, C.J.). See LEONARD
W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957), at 84.
67. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 3. See Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves:
The Anthony Burns Case, Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1793 (1997); Louise Weinberg, Methodological Interventions and the Slavery Cases:
Night-Thoughts of a Legal Realist, 56 MD. L. REV. 1316, 1342-59 (1997) (recounting the
struggle in the courts over fugitive slaves).
68. It is sometimes remarked that the South would never have joined the Union
had not the Constitution embodied a sacred bargain guaranteeing Southern state signatories' rights to their existing labor systems. The Fugitive Slave Clause was a prominent
feature of the sacred bargain. Interestingly, at least one Northern judge reasoned. to the
contrary, that the North would not have signed the Constitution had it imagined that it
could be invaded by bounty hunters. and its own free black citizens kidnapped and sent
into chattel slavery. In re Booth. 3 Wis. 13. 72 (1854) (Crawford. J.. dissenting).
69. For the antebellum interstate conflict over the freedom vel non of non-fugitive
slaves, see Louise Weinberg, Of Theory and Theodicy: The Problem of Immoral Law, in
LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD (Symeon Symeonides ed., 2002), at 473-99;
PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY. FEDERALISM. AND COMITY
(1981); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note 67. at 1316.
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upon, that trespass will lie for an injury done to them. or trover for converting them. But it would be a perversion of terms
to say, that such local laws do in fact make them personal
70
property generally ....

A similar uneasiness with the chattel aspect of slavery is
echoed, also in passing, in Salmon P. Chase's brief in the Birney
7
case in Ohio. ' Chase wrote, "I maintain that the relation of
owner and property, as existing between person and person, has.
or can have, no existence in this state ......
On some such thinking, a Lincoln Supreme Court might
overrule Dred Scott- by redefining the category of "property''
as incapable of attaching to human beings for purposes of the
Due Process Clause. The question was raised in argument in
Dred Scott.n Yet in Dred Scott, only Justice McLean, dissenting,
seems to have had a doubt about property in human chattel, and
he expressed this quite casually, without developing the argument: "But we know as a historical fact, that James Madison.
that great and good man, a leading member in the Federal Convention, was solicitous to guard the language of that instrument
so as not to convey the idea that there could be property in
man.
True, the Founders owned slaves themselves. a fact on
which Chief Justice Taney relied in Dred Scott. Taney suggested
that the Founders could not, without hypocrisy, own slaves while
thinking it wrong. 74 Dred Scott's originalism on this point is
among Taney's least edifying tropes. Justice McLean, dissenting,
responded,
~, 7~

I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a means
of construing the Constitution in all its bearings, rather than
to look behind that period, into a traffic which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with death by Christian nations. I do not like to draw the sources of our domestic rela7
tions from so dark a ground. '

Chief Justice Taney's kind of originalism would fasten upon
us the sins of the fathers, stripping them, and with them the Con70.
71.

Aves' Case. 35 Mass. at 216.
Birney v. State. 8 Ohio 230.231 (1837) (brief of Salmon P. Chase).
72. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 451 ("[l]t seems. however. to be supposed. that there is a
difference between property in a slave and other property. and that different rules may
be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of the United States .... ").
73. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 537.
74. /d. at 410.
75. /d. at 537.
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stitution, of their ideals and aspirations. It would take from us
that legacy. A Lincoln appointee might prefer to gauge the
Framers' aspirations from the Declaration of Independence, as
Lincoln liked to do, rather than from the exigent compromises to
which the Framers submitted in Philadelphia in 1787. But a Lincoln Court could not pretend that the Constitution did not recognize slavery, even though, as Lincoln argued at Cooper Union,
7
the Constitution did not "expressly" affirm slavery. " The Constitution does not establish property in slaves, but it variously recognizes the existence of slavery and makes accommodations to
slavery. Paul Finkelman has discussed these at length in various
of his writings. 77 Slaves were to count as fractions of persons for
the purposes of both taxation and representation. 7x Fugitive
slaves were to be returned. 74 The slave trade was not to be prohibited before 1808. 80 It also seems relevant that the Senate consists of two representatives from each state, large or small, with1
out possibility of amendment,' an arrangement enabling a
Southern majority to block an appointment to the federal judiciary. Furthermore, the supermajorities that the logic of the Constitution required for the amendment processx2 ensured that the
South would enjoy a permanent veto over proposed amendments to the Constitution. While neither provision was merely
an obeisance to the concerns of the slave South, Southern delegates to the Constitutional Convention could return to the South
claiming them as victories.
In providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, the Fifth Amendment is
understood to mean at a minimum that before federal authorities can execute, imprison, or fine anyone, before a federal court
can impose a sentence or assess damages or issue an injunction,
due process first requires notice, trial, and judgment. And in
76. Cf Lincoln. Address at Cooper Union. New York (Feb. 27. 1860). in I
COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 599.
77. See, e.g.. PAUL FINKELMAN. SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS. RACE AND
LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (2d ed .. 2001 ).
78. U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 2. cl. 3. ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union. according to
their respective Numbers. which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of
free Persons. including those bound to Service for a Term of Years. and excluding Indians not taxed. three fifths of all other Persons.").
79. U.S. CONST. art. IV.§ 2. cl. 3.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 9. cl. I.
81. U.S. CONST. art I. § 3 (providing for equal state representation in the Senate):
art. V (providing for constitutional amendments. except that "no State. without its Consent. shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.").
82. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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1860 it is fair to say not only that most Americans, North and
South, would have thought the Due Process Clause to be purely
''procedural" in this sense, but also that most Americans, North
and South, would have understood the "property'' protected by
the Clause to include slave property. Many today still believe
that it did. Recently David Currie, for example, has termed
"fatuous" the argument in the 37th Congress, as it prepared to
abolish slavery in the capital, that there could be no property in
human beings, because that argument was "contradicted by decades of history in the District of Columbia and centuries of it
elsewhere.""'
Southerners took the argument further. They also argued
that the Fifth Amendment protected slave-owners' "liberty" as
well as their "property." This was a liberty to take their slaves
with them into the territories, free of federal interference. They
sometimes argued that the concesrt of ''due process" included
the concept of ''equality" as well. In this view, due process required the nation to give equal respect to Southern as to Northern property rights, to slave as to other property, and to Southerners' as well as Northerners' rights to travel to, or settle in, a
United States territory-with their "property." As Chief Justice
Taney put this in Dred Scott,
And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the
master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen,
no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States,
whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to
draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of the
85
Government.

Actually, if there is such a right it is very qualified. There is
no Fifth Amendment right, or any other right, to take property
83. Currie, The Civil War Congress, supra note 24. at 1149.
84. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause incorporates the concept of "equal protection" as found in the Fourteenth Amendment). The notion that due process requires evenhandedness, of course, is
very old.
85. Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 451. See Democratic [Breckinridge Faction] Platform,
para. 1, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 28, at 31 ("[T]he Government of a
Territory organized by an act of Congress is provisional and temporary, and during its
existence all citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with their property
in the Territory. without their rights, either of person or property. being destroyed or
impaired by Congressional or Territorial legislation.").
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of any kind into a territory or even a state. absolutely free of
federal interference. The nation rather obviously must have the
power, whenever the national interest so requires, to confiscate
suspect articles of property anywhere in the country- in these
security-conscious times a feature of life annoying to every frequent flier. Congress possesses the national powers, whatever
they may be, everywhere in the nation, as well as on land within
its exclusive control, like the territories, or Washington, D.C., or
a post office. The power of Congress is clearer in the territories,
where it is unconstrained by considerations of federalism, and
clearest in the capital, where the Constitution uses its strongest
terms of legislative power.s" Congress is the local as well as the
7
national legislature for the territories of the United States," although it may provide for a separate local territorial legislature.
And Congress can certainly require the confiscation of contraband found in a territory organized under the laws of the United
States. Chief Justice Taney's supposed unabridgeable right to
take one's property into United States territory is and was
imaginary.
One can expect to see this most easily, of course, in situations in which national power is at its maximum. Although wartime abolition in the District of Columbia was with modest
"compensation,""' the national power physically and completely
to confiscate slave property, anywhere, as well as to prohibit
slavery in the territories, seems to have been well understood, at
least as a power of the military in the Civil War period. Consider
that Union commanders, after first punctiliously sending runaway slaves back to their plantations and farms, began, under
89
the influence of the Confiscation Acts, to designate runaway
slaves as "contraband." Slaves were walking away from slavery
wherever Union armies appeared, and could not be shooed away
as they doggedly trudged along in the rear. The designation of
slaves as "contraband of war" legitimized the army's "confiscation" of slave "property."
But it is also true that national power over property is always exercised in the teeth of American respect for property.
Private property has always had a sacrosanct quality in this
86. U.S. CONST. art. I. §8. cl. 17.
87. Amer. Ins. Co. v. Canter. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.).
88. Act of Apr. 16, 1862. ch. 54. 12 Stat. 376 (abolishing slavery in the District of
Columbia. setting the rate of compensation at $300.00 per slave).
89. See Confiscation Acts. supra note 2; SILVANA R. SiDDALl. FROM PROPERTY TO
PERSON: SLAVERY Al'OD THE CONFISCATION ACTS 1861-1862 (2005), at 37-54.
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country. Typically, private property is protected by state law,
and. as Chief Justice Taney pointed out in Dred Scott, it is protected from arbitrary forfeiture to the national government.
Property in slaves was specifically a matter for state governance,
as affirmed in 1850 in Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the case
90
of Strader v. Graham. Reading quotidian antebellum cases, we
are confronted with an overwhelming universal respect for rights
in property. Property rights could stand in the way of slaves' petitions for freedom in Northern courts as well as Southern. 91
Justice McLean, dissenting in Dred Scott, was constrained to
acknowledge the deference due to the-spurious, as we knowright to travel unimpeded with one's property. "It is said the
Territories are common property of the States," McLean wrote,
"and that every man has a right to go there with his property.
92
This is not controverted.'' A substantial unwarranted concession lies in those few words.
Of course even if our hypothetical Supreme Court were to
reinterpret the word "property" in the Fifth Amendment so as
not to include property in persons, this could not free the slaves.
At best, by its example such a reinterpretation could discourage
state laws and customs, North and South. embodying the concept of chattel slavery. Such a ruling would revive the power of
judges to free ''sojourners" in territory in which Congress had
abolished slavery, because it would have revived the power of
Congress to create free territory. The immediate effect in law of
overruling Dred Scott on this ground would be to restore Congress's power to prohibit slavery in the territories, and thus to
revive "compromise" legislation deligitimized by Dred Scott. It
might seem especially important that overruling Dred Scott on
this ground would re-empower Congress to reach some fresh
compromise of the territories issue. But in our hypothetical
1860s, as in 1860 actually, the South would not have stood for a
new prohibition of slavery anywhere, and would have had sufficient Democratic strength in the Senate to block any such new
compromise. 93 Any difference it might have made, in our hypothetical, that the South would no longer be buoyed by Dred

90. 51 U.S. 82 (1850) (Taney. C.J.) (holding no federal question raised by a judgment determining slave status vel non: that is exclusively a question of state law).
91. See. e.g.. In re Williams. 29 F. Cas. 1334. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1839) (noting the clash
between the claims of humanity and the claims of property: ultimately ruling against rendition of the alleged fugitive slave).
92. Dred Scolt. 60 U.S. at 549.
93. For the tally in the lame duck 36th Congress. see supra note 24.
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Scott, would seem to be cancelled by the likelihood that the
South would have been inflamed by Dred Scott's overrule. Nor
in our hypothetical can we blame the South exclusively for the
likely impasse. In the past, as we have seen, the power to prohibit slavery was a power Congress was habitually too riven by
faction to exercise except, at best, in some territory, and in "balanced" fashion, in some legislated "compromise" which would
tacitly permit slavery in some other territory. In December 1860,
however, the presidency was in the hands of Abraham Lincoln, a
man adamantly opposed to the expansion of slavery into the territories. The enactment of some new "compromise," allowing
slavery in some territory as the customary quid pro quo for prohibiting it elsewhere, was simply not on the cards.

VI. BETTER THEORY: IF SLA YES WERE "PERSONS''
We have been looking at the constitutional concept of
"property." We have seen that, should our hypothetical Supreme Court overrule Dred Scott by construing the Fifth
Amendment word "property'' so as not to include slaves, the
consequence would simply be to restore the status quo ante, as
far as the power of Congress is concerned. In so doing, it would
restore the existing "compromises," and so indirectly restore discretion to courts to free "sojourners" in territory Congress had
designated as free. From the evidence of the Dred Scott litigation
itself, however, Southern courts would be much less willing than
formerly to free sojourners in any event.~ What if slaves were to
be considered "persons" for purposes of the Due Process
Clause? What would be the constitutional consequences of that?
I raise this as a separate question because it permits me to sort
out the arguments specifically pertaining to it.
We have seen that there was some feeling. at least. among
antebellum lawyers and judges, that the concept of "property"
ought not, might not, and possibly could not, include human beings. Starting from an assumption that there can be no ''property" in human beings-a self-evident proposition with us, however shaky with lawyers then- there emerges a seemingly
obvious solution to the problem of finding apparently strong
constitutional theory for an overruling of Dred Scott. This solution, at least to a modern imagination, might seem no more
strained than Chief Justice Taney's analogous position in Dred
4

94.

See Scott v. Emerson. supra note 39.
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Scott. But. for reasons that will appear-and these are serious
reasons-this solution seems not to have commended itself to
lawyers and judges at the time. For some. it seems simply not to
have been perceived. When ventured, it seems not to have been
developed in any thoughtful way beyond its mere assertion.
The solution. if it was one, was hiding in plain sight. "'In
plain sight,'' because political actors adverted to it, as obvious
constitutional interpretation, in major statements of principle.
"Hiding," because it seems not to have been thought through or
developed in any sustained way or relied on with any confidence. It does not seem to have been taken up and discussed
much, either in courts or at large. As the basis of a strong attack
on Dred Scott it might have seemed doubtful, hardly serious, unsound, an ultimately unconvincing way of looking at the constitutional problem. At a deeper level. the difficulties accompanying any such purported solution might well have seemed
insurmountable.
Simply put, the proposed solution would count slaves as
"persons" for Fifth Amendment purposes. At least in our own
thinking, that slaves are "persons" seems a much more natural
reading of the Fifth Amendment of 1791 than Chief Justice
Taney's. It rests in part on strong textual and contextual foundations in the Constitution of 1789. Slaves are nowhere accounted
in the Constitution as "property,'' but rather, are designated everywhere as "persons." The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment could not be read as protecting "property" in
slaves, if it was to be read consistently with the uniform constitutional usage of "'persons." The Constitution repeatedly makes
explicit this fundamental understanding of slaves exclusively as
"persons." Slaves appear as "Persons" in the Three Fifths
Clause, providing that for purposes, on the one hand, of representation of population in the House, and, on the other, for apportionment of taxes based on population, only three-fifths of
such "Persons,'' including those "bound to labor,'' were to be
counted. 9; This usage of "Persons" then reappears in the clause
denying Congress power to prohibit the slave trade before
1808. 90 And it is "'Persons" who are the object of the Fugitive
95. U.S. CO!'IST. art. I.§ 2. cl. 3. ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union. according to
their respective Numbers. which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of
free Persons. including those bound to Service for a Term of Years. and excluding Indians not taxed. three fifths of all other Persons.").
96. U.S. CONST. art I. § 9. cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as

2007]

OVERCOMING DRED

759

Slave Clause,y7 requiring the delivering up of a runaway slave
upon the claim of the master (not designated as the "owner").YH
This usage of personhood does not vary. Nowhere in the
Constitution are slaves designated as "property." Nowhere in
the Constitution are slaves designated as slaves. Slavery is neither mentioned in the Constitution of 1789 nor the Bill of Rights
of 1791. The Constitution uses fastidious circumlocutions instead. Since, under the Constitution, slaves were always "persons," and never ''property," it would seem more natural in
reading the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution to adopt this
emphatic constitutional usage, which it was never supposed to
have been an intention of the Bill of Rights to undo. In this more
natural reading of the Fifth Amendment, slaves would remain
the same "persons" they are in the Constitution. In view of this
striking textual usage, Chief Justice Taney's reading of the constitutional texts begins to seem not only ungrounded but perverse, if only on textual grounds. (As Taney could not know, the
word "slavery" first appears in the Constitution in 1865, with the
Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing it.9Y)
If it can be agreed that, under the Fifth Amendment of
1791, slaves must be accounted "persons," just as they were persons under the Constitution of 1789, then the Due Process
Clause kicks in on their behalf, and slaves become persons whom
the nation may not, without due process of law, deprive of their
lives, their liberty, or their property-in this context, property in
the fruits of their own labor. And this right to their own lives,
liberty and labor is theirs, at least as against federal interference,
notwithstanding the absence, in our hypothetical, of the Thirteenth Amendment. Caveat: In asserting this I am eliding a good
many tough questions. But it is necessary to state the proposition
before dealing with its deficiencies, serious as those deficiencies
may be.

any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit. shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight. but a Tax or duty may
be imposed on such Importation. not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.").
97. U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 2. cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one
State. under the Laws thereof. escaping into another. shall. in Consequence of any Law
or Regulation therein. be discharged from such Service or Labour. but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.").
98. It is of some interest that the Fugitive Slave Clause contains no language empowering Congress to enforce it. although Article IV. Clause I. gave Congress power to
legislate for effectuation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
99. "Neither slaverv nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United
States. or any place subje~t to their jurisdi~tion." U.S. CaNST. amend. XIII.§ 1 (1865).
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It is hard to imagine disagreement today with the casting of
slaves as "persons." We have the Reconstruction Amendments,
and the civil rights laws. Besides, our moral views have
improved. However, we can reasonably suppose, with more than
mere presentism, that if this reinterpretation of the Fifth
Amendment is sound today, it would at least have had some
force then, given the great weight of anti-slavery feeling in the
country, not only in 1860 but at the time of the Founding.
One fact concerning the history of the Due Process Clause
stands out. From the beginning, when first proposed by James
Madison in the House on June 8, 1789, through all the drafts and
debates on the Bill of Rights, the language of the Due Process
Clause, its language of "persons," "deprivation,'' "life", "liberty," and ''property," remained substantially the same.HxJ The
1789 draft of the Fifth Amendment, as first proposed, read, in
pertinent part, ''No person shall ... be deprived of his life, lib101
erty. or property, without due process of law." There was no
discussion of this wording in either the House or Senate. I do not
find intelligible debate on the meaning of either the word "property'' or the word "person.''
The likeliest explanation of the easy acceptance of the Due
Process Clause in the draft of 1789, notwithstanding the prevalence of slavery over much of the young country, is that the
words were already traditional boilerplate. The Due Process
Clause probably would have conveyed to an observer at the time
no more than a traditional expression of the fundamental right
of Englishmen, or free men, to trial before punishment, according to the law of the land. Consider that a similar calm reception.
notwithstanding slavery, was accorded the language of the Declaration of Independence, that "all men are created equal." Yet
~y the 185~s. anti-slavery _l~aders were r~.~ying on the Declaratlon as calhng for the abohtwn of slavery. - Just as cultural contradiction forced a change in meaning, over time, in the case of

!00. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS (Neil H. Cogan ed .. !997). at 265-94; see also
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Helen E. Veil eta!. eds .. 1991).
101. I CONG. REC. (Jun. 8. 1789). at 315.
102. For his part. Lincoln liked to rely on the Declaration of Independence. with its
proclamation that all men are created equal. Lincoln would say at Gettysburg that America was dedicated at its birth to that proposition. Speech at Gettysburg, Pennsylvama
(Nov. 19. 1863). in II COMPLETE WORKS. supra note 22. at 439; see generally GEORGE P.
FLETCHER. "NOR LONG REMEMBER:" OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LiNCOLN
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001): GARY WILLS. LiNCOLN AT GETTYSBURG:
THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA (1982).
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the Declaration, so also it could have done in the case of the
Due Process Clause.
It may come as a shock to some readers that a radical reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment along the lines described
103
was in fact already quite apparent in the antebellum period. In
the 1840s there emerged a new political party, the Liberty
Party/'J.l a precursor of the Republican Party of the mid-1850s.
The chief aims of the Liberty Party were to defeat the mainstream big political coalitions, the Whig and Democratic parties,
and to delegitimize the statutory "compromises" of the past,
which had been engineered by leaders of those parties, since all
of the old compromises had authorized slavery to some extent.
In the Liberty Party's platforms we find an unambiguous reading
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as protecting
the life. liberty, and property of persons from national authorization of their enslavement. You see this reading in one of the earliest of all party platforms, the Liberty Party's platform of 1844.
A plank in this platform resolves that ''the fundamental truths of
the Declaration of Independence, that all men are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, was [sic] made the fundamental law of our National Government, by that amendment
of the constitution which declares that no persons shall be de105
prived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
Thus the Liberty Party was already making a substantive due
process argument long before Chief Justice Taney did so in Dred
Scott- but one working in precisely the opposite direction.
The successor to the Liberty Party, the Free Soil Party, was
more overtly concerned with protecting the work and wages of
1110
white labor from slave competition. The Free Sailers also limited the scope of their argument to the territories. They argued
that. while the Constitution might preserve and protect slavery
in the slave states, the Fifth Amendment's protection of personal
liberty as against the nation disempowered Congress from permitting slavery in any place under the nation's exclusive control.
103. See Robert R. Russel. Constillltional Doctrines with Regard to Slavery in the
Terri wries. 32 J. So. HI ST. 466 ( 1966).
104. Liberty Party Platform. Campaign of 1844. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS.
supra note 28. at 4. The Liberty Party drew its anti-slavery membership from the socalled ··Barn burner Democrats .. and .. Conscience Whigs ... /d. at 10.
I 05. Liberty Party Platform of 1844. para. 9. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS ..HIpra note 28. at 5.
106. See ERIC FONER. FREE SOIL. FREE LABOR. FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE REPL'BLIC A:\ PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR ( 1970).
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In their view, because of the exclusivity of national control over
the territories, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause protected slaves as "persons" from Congressional deprivation of
their liberty in the territories. In the 1848 campaign, the Free
Sailers adopted a platform declaring that "our fathers ... expressly denied to the Federal Government, which they created,
all constitutional power to deprive an~ person of life, liberty, or
property, without due legal process." 10
In the campaign of 1852, this Party, significantly enlarged,
called itself the Free Democratic Party. Its platform reiterated
that ·'the Constitution of the United States, ... expressly denies
to the General Government all power to deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 108
The Free Sailers transformed themselves once more in the
campaign of 1856 into the American Party, or the "KnowNothings."]()') They adopted nativist anti-immigration and antiCatholic policies. These policies were prompted for the most
part by the same concern that prompted their anti-slavery policy:
the maintenance of work and wages for existing American free
labor.
The new Republican Party was an outgrowth and coming
together of all of these essentially Northern Whig parties. In the
first Republican Party platform, in 1856, we see the same substantive interpretation of the Due Process Clause:
[Resolved,] That . . . as our Republican fathers, when they
had abolished Slavery in all our national territory, ordained
that 'no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law,' it becomes our duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this
provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it;
and we deny the authority of Congress, of a territoriallegisla-

107. Free Soil Party Platform of 1848, fourth resolution. in NATIONAL PARTY
PLATFORMS. supra note 28, at 13.
108. Free Democratic Platform of 1852, para. IV. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS,
supra note 28. at 18.
109. The term "Know-Nothings" is said to have originated in the secret club that
became a nucleus of the party of that name. The club was reputed to have directed its
members. when asked about it. to say. ··I know nothing ... See Michael F. Holt, The Antimasonic and Know Nothing Parties. in I HISTORY OF UNITED STATES POLITICAL
PARTIES (Arthur Schlesinger. Jr. ed .. 1973). at 575-620: but see TYLER ANBINDER.
NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS AND THE POLITICS OF
THE 1850s (1992) (not offering this hypothesis).
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ture, or of any individuals. to give !epa! existence to Slavery in
any Territory of the United States. w

In 1860 Lincoln ran on a Republican platform forcefully reiterating the applicability of the Due Process Clause to persons
enslaved, at least in the territories, in language substantially
111
identical to that of the 1856 campaign.
Here, then, is stronger constitutional theory that at first
blush well might undergird a case-a case not declaring slavery
unconstitutional, but declaring Congress powerless to enable it.
The theory that seems to have evaded antebellum anti-slavery
lawyers and judges had been available, apparently, all along. The
means of attacking Dred Scott on constitutional grounds seemingly lay ready to hand.
Yet it is significant that neither Justice McLean nor Justice
Curtis, dissenting in Dred Scott, were willing to indulge in such
thinking. There is no argument, in either opinion, that the Fifth
Amendment protects liberty, not slavery. If the reading of the
Fifth Amendment proposed here would have been natural in the
antebellum period, why did neither of the able dissenters in
Dred Scott argue it? Why does the argument not occur in any
developed fashion in antebellum writings?
The likely reasons are many, and are substantial. Curiously,
current commen~ators have s~arc~~Y addre_ssed them. Curre?t
commentators, With few exceptiOns - have, hke commentators m
the antebellum period, avoided raising even the possibility of the
proposed rereading of the Due Process Clause, even if only to
expose whatever flaws they might find in it. Yet when they do,
they tend to make unconvincing arguments. The Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment seems to have deflected some commentators from the Due Process Clause, entangling them in problems of compensation or reparations. 113 Others, as we have seen,

110.

Republican Platform of 1856. Resolution 2. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS.

supra note 28, at 27.
111. Republican Platform of 1860. para. 8. in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS. supra
note 28. at 32.
112. See, e.g.. Jennifer P. Arlen. Of Property Rights and the Fifth Amendment. 33
WM. & MARY L. REV. 299.317 (1991): "The flaw in Taney's reasoning was his characterization of the slaveholder as a property owner. ... Only the slaveholder's rights concerned Taney. and he did not question whether Scott had been deprived of his liberty
without due process of law."
·
113. See, e.g.. DAVID P. CL'RRIE. DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM: 1R29-1861
(2005). at 13: see also Kaimipono David Wenger. Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation.
53 AM. U. L. REV. 191.251-55 (2003).
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become bogged down in outdated criticisms of substantive due
process. What are the real obstacles to the proposal?
Most obviously, the proposed revised reading of the Fifth
Amendment might seem to place the restrictions of the
Amendment improperly on private persons instead of upon the
national government. If the lives, liberty, or property of slaves
were what mattered, it was not the nation that imported, bought,
owned, or employed slave labor, or in any other way deprived
slaves of life, liberty, or property. It was the slave-masters who
did. ~ But the Fifth Amendment does not control private conduct.
An answer to this is that, in the old compromises, Congress
had implicitly authorized slavery. In our own understandings, of
course, it is reasonably clear that the "governmental action" requirement of constitutional review is satisfied even if government merely enables private acts that, if public acts, would violate the Constitution. In the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court was to hold, in Reitman v. Mulkey, that government could
not entangle itself in private discrimination, even when the challenged law authorizing private discrimination was approved by
referendum. 115 I can recall no Reitman-like authority in the antebellum period, but there would seem to have been no definite
bar to such reasoning in a Lincoln Supreme Court in the 1860s.
Even so, some modern writers have been perplexed by this
class of problems, as John Hart Ely seems to have been, beguiled
11

1l.t See John Hart Ely, Interc/ausa/ Immunity. 87 VA. L. REV. 1185. 1159 (2001)
(taking the position that government could have no responsibility for slavery in a case
challenging an enslavement. since the slave-master was the logical defendant in such a
case. not the government). See, analogously. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social
Serv .. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In that case. a local agency sent a social worker to visit an
abused child. Joshua DeShaney. regularly. The social worker repeatedly noted the child's
deteriorating condition. but took no action. The Court. by Chief Justice Rehnquist. ruled
that the agency could not be held liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. §
1983. for Joshua's ultimate vegetative status requiring permanent institutionalization.
since his father. not the agency. was the abuser. Note that the DeShaney principle does
not apply where the plaintiff is injured while in the custody or control of government officials. Revere v. Massachusetts General HospitaL 463 U.S. 239 (1983): Youngberg v.
Romeo. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
115. Reitman v. Mulkey. 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (striking down under the Equal Protection Clause an amendment to California's constitution. approved by referendum. on the
ground that the amendment entangled the state in private discriminatory choices: the
amendment barred the state from prohibiting anyone from refusing. within her discretion. to sell. lease or rent real property to anyone): Romer v. Evans. 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(striking down under the Equal Protection Clause an amendment to Colorado's constitution. approved by referendum. on the ground that the amendment could be explained
onlv bv animus to the affected class: the amendment selectively disqualified sexual prefere~ce" for the protections of state civil rights law).
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by the hypothetical case of judicial review of a particular enslavement. It appeared to Ely that state action would be wanting
in such a case, since slaves are obviously deprived of their liberty
11
by their masters, not by government. " Professor Ely down117
played the principle of Shelley v. Kraemer, limiting it to its own
facts, and apparently not reading as relevant the mass of civil
cases in which judicial assumptions of jurisdiction or authorizations of attachment in wholly private cases are struck down under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or
11
such other wholly private cases as Times v. Sullivan, H in which it
is the action of a court that constitutes the alleged constitutional
violation. ~
11

It might be argued, with more force, that Congress could
not. by mere exception, inaction, and tacit understanding, be
held accountable for the establishment of slavery in territory
which it merely exempted from abolition. Yet in a larger sense
the tacit national permission to a territory to opt for slave status
was never innocent. The responsibility of Congress for slavery in
slave territories seems clear enough. No reasonably sentient
American in 1820 could have believed that the legislated exemption from abolition for territories below the Missouri Compromise line was not an authorization of slavery in those territories.
The point of the successive "compromise" acts of Congress was
to allow for the establishment of slave territories as the quid pro
quo for abolition elsewhere. The Compromise of 1850 left open
the option, however unlikely of exercise, of slavery in territory
that would become New Mexico and Utah. The "popular sovereignty" of the Kansas-Nebraska Act does not escape this analysis. In the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, the very purpose of
''popular sovereignty" was to leave open the option of slavery in
the designated territory. Congress could not do this without responsibility in fact for facilitating the deprivation of liberty to
individuals thereafter held as slaves under the law of that territory. Congress could not compromise away the fundamental
rights of individuals. To whatever extent a reinterpretation of
116. Ely. !nterc/ausa!lmmunity. supra note 114. at 1199.
117. 334 U.S. I (1948) (holding. under the Equal Protection Clause. that state judges
may not enforce racially restrictive covenants in actions between private parties).
118. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (under the First Amendment striking down an application of state libel law in an action by a public figure against
a newspaper. when actual malice had not been shown).
119. See. e.g .. Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (striking down under the Equal Protection Clause a Florida court"s order mandating a vote recount using too vague a standard).
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the Due Process Clause that would lead us to this conclusion
would require an imaginative leap in the 1860s, the leap ought to
have been relatively easy for a Court whose recent predecessor
had leapt over a natural reading of the Due Process Clause to
produce a strained holding disabling to Congress at a time of
great national need. Given the Republican Party's principles in
the election of 1860, a strong Lincoln Court might well perceive
the utter disregard in Dred Scott of the personhood, and thus the
120
humanity, of the enslaved population.
What. then, would become the condition of the territories
upon an overturning of Dred Scott on this ground? All territories
of the United States would be free, since no act of Congress or
its delegates, the territorial legislatures, would be constitutional,
if it purported to allow, establish, or maintain slavery.
I pause to note that the territories were the particular concern in Dred Scott, and we need not argue that Congress should
also be accounted ultimately responsible for slavery in the slave
121
states carved out of slave territory. We need not try to argue
that an overturning of Dred Scott on the ground proposed would
therefore liberate the slaves within those states. We do not need
to make that case. But we can be aware that in permitting a territory to be settled by slave-owners, Congress typically would
have anticipated that states emerging from that territory would
opt for slave status. And those states were understood to be
creatures of Congress. Their legislatures, like territorial legislatures, could be accounted Congress's delegates. It might not be
too much to say that Congress was responsible in fact for deprivations of the liberty of persons in new slave states. The major
argument to the contrary is that new slave states became independent of Congress. Even if Congress was an original cause of
slavery in a new slave state. once a state was admitted to the Union the establishment and maintenance of slavery in its own laws
would constitute an intervening cause, and an apparently suffi-

120. Humane feelings toward the slaves were not uncommon, and were argued
paternalistically in support of slavery. See KENNETH M. STAMPP. THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1989) (1956). at 322-30.
121. I refer here to existing slave states that came into being after the original thirteen. Questions concerning future new slave states were moot as a practical matter. After
the Compromise of 1850 it was understood that there could be no more new slave states.
Southern hopes were focusing on the Caribbean. See H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 33-93, at 127
(1854) ("Ostend Manifesto"] (recommending the United States to offer Spain $130 million for Cuba. and. if spurned, to "wrest'' Cuba from Spain); see also Democratic Platform of 1860 (Breckinridge Faction). in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 28,
at 31 (advocating in its second resolution the acquisition of Cuba).
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cient one. And we recall that in 1850, in Strader v. Graham, the
Supreme Court had held that the slave status of persons raised
122
no federal question, but was entirely a matter of state law. In
addition, the old compromises generally provided that new
states should enter the Union on an "equal footing" with the
original thirteen states. It was part of the intention of the "equal
footing" clauses to insulate slavery in new slave states from constitutional or legal attack. Just as the original slave states were
embraced by the Constitution of 1789, with all its accommodations to slavery, so also would new slave states be. In this way.
Congress tried retroactively to bestow upon new slave states not
only the constitutional privileges accorded slave-owners, but the
constitutional and therefore moral blessing of the Framers. But,
as to this last point, a Lincoln Court might hold that Congress
should not be permitted, by a verbal ingenuity in ordinary legislation to create an illusion of constitutionality and extend it over
a deprivation of liberty in fact. No clever language about "equal
footing," the Court might reason, could bar effective judicial review of what could be deemed, in effect, a governmental establishment of slavery. Yet, taken all in all, I find it too much of a
strain to conclude that an overruling of Dred Scott could be
stretched to turn the newer slave states into free territory.
Returning to the problem of slavery in the territories, there
were far more serious difficulties in the way of the proposed
overruling of Dred Scott than I have mentioned thus far or seen
discussed in the literature. A redefinition of slaves as Fifth
Amendment "persons," taken for all it was worth, could up-end
basic legal and constitutional understandings, and enmesh society in anomalies of governance, logic, and feeling. A retroactive
reading of the Fifth Amendment (as prohibiting Congress from
authorizing slavery, expressly or impliedly), without more, could
not abolish slavery nationwide. It would leave slavery intact, at a
minimum in the original thirteen states, and probably in all
states in which it existed. But it would void the Fugitive Slave
Clause-once the Fifth Amendment was perceived to have
amended that Clause-and with it, of course, the Fugitive Slave
123
Act. Federal courts, and indeed the Supreme Court, could not

122. 51 U.S. 82 (1850) (Taney, C.J.).
123. In addition, private parties could not retain the self-executing constitutional
"right" of recaption of their fugitive slave "property" under the rule of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539. 612-13 (1842). That right required no implementation by
Congress, but once slaves were adjudged "persons." they would presumably lose their
status as "property," and Prigg could not stand.
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continue to acknowledge master-slave relationships. even within
slave states. since the Fifth Amendment controls the conduct of
federal judges. Our reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment
would seem to require endowing slaves. even those within the
slave states, with all the protections of the Bill of Rights. in any
action concerning them, as long as that action fell within one of
the heads of federal jurisdiction available at the time- although
state judges would remain free to enforce slave law.
And there would remain difficulties of logic. To suppose
that the slaves were Fifth Amendment "persons" would have
seemed, in the minds of most Americans, at best only a troubling
paradox. Although the Fifth Amendment constrains only national power, a right of slaves to any liberty at all would have
seemed incompatible with the condition of servitude. It was the
sheer illogic of the thing. How could "slaves'' have "rights?" It
was simply a contradiction in terms. In whatever way the Constitution designated them, they were slaves, and indeed, remained
"property'' under state law. Almost by definition. slaves could
hardly enjoy the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. It is
only a partial answer to all this that the Due Process Clause protects not slaves, but persons. It is easy enough to say that an authorization by Congress to permit slavery should trigger the
Fifth Amendment, not blot it out. It is much harder to imagine a
pre-Fourteenth Amendment world in which slaves have federal
liberty rights but remain slaves under state law.
The difficulties we have been describing would be erased, or
at least set on the path of extinction, even in the absence of the
Fourteenth Amendment, by a Supreme Court case overruling
Barron v. Baltimore, the case in which the Court, by Chief Justice Marshall, held that the Bill of Rights limited only the nation
124
and did not control state governmental acts. State-law property
rights, state-law protections of slavery, state responsibility for
the condition of servitude, would have been addressable much
more readily without Barron. So obvious is the desirability of
this that our hypothetical Supreme Court might itself see the
need. and overturn Strader as well as Barron, in the same case in
which it overrules Dred Scott. And yet the very sweepingness of
the desirable change is some indication of the political difficulty
and practical peril of the project of trying to extricate the country from Dred Scott. If the Fifth Amendment became applicable
124. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Marshall. C.J.) (holding the Bill of Rights applicable
only to the nation. not the states).
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to the states, and slaves were held to be not "property" but ''persons" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, we would
have a legal regime substantially the equivalent of a Fourteenth
Amendment in which the Bill of Rights was "incorporated." The
upshot would be that the nation would have a clarified complete
power of abolition of slavery even within the existing states. It
may be somewhat soothing to the spirit vexed by the unreality of
all this anachronistic progressiveness that we are at least describing the state of the law, more or less, that we finally do have in
our own day. But all this would have been so revolutionary in
Southern thinking in its time that it might have triggered the
same secession that, in our convenient hypothetical the South
rejects in 1861, with the same danger that secession might spill
over to the border states.
And then there were matters of feeling. There were psychological obstacles to the visibility of the personhood of the slaves
or to any understanding of the constitutional import of their personhood. There was a racial presumption of slavery in the South,
so that slavery was associated with a black skin. Many Americans then would not have conceded to slaves, and often not even
to black freedmen, a personhood capacious enough to have endowed them with even limited membership in the American
community. Chief Justice Taney pointed this out at dispiriting
12
length in Dred Scott. ' In those days many Americans could not,
with the best will in the world, seriously imagine black persons
as entitled to rights, even if it would have been logical to do so,
and even if it were conceded on all sides that these were rights
only against federal, not state, intrusion, and even if this latter
arrangement were not anomalous. Rather, Chief Justice Taney's
view, that blacks had no rights which whites were bound to respect, might have seemed to many then far more natural than
any proposition to the contrary. Especially convincing to them
would have been Taney's outraged and incredulous cry that to
grant blacks personhood ("citizenship," in that context,) would
have been to grant them a right to "keep and carry arms wher12
ever they went." " The proposed reorientation of the Due Process Clause, then, taken all in all, seems too problematic to be developed without great difficulty.
At least we can say that our consideration of the proposed
revised view of slaves as "persons" has helped us to see the es125.
126.

Dred Scott. 60 U.S. at 403.407-17.
/d. at 416.
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sential wrongness of Dred Scott. The case's true constitutional
infirmity, whatever difficulties may have stood in the way of correcting that infirmity, becomes much clearer to us. We can now
see that Chief Justice Taney twisted the Due Process Clause to
his pro-slavery purposes, closing his eyes to the Clause's full
bearing and more natural reading. Read straightforwardly, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects the freedom of all persons from arbitrary deprivation by the nation of
life, liberty. or property. Slavery amounts to a more total deprivation of all these things-life, liberty, and property-than any
other that can be imagined. short of death. Chief Justice Taney's
holding in Dred Scott, then, amounted to a perversion of the better meaning of the Due Process Clause-one that was apparent
at the time. If a better reading of the Fifth Amendment was utterly impracticable in the conditions of the time, the Dred Scott
Court should have rested content with its jurisdictional ruling.
VII. THE IRONIES
Interestingly, an overruling of Dred Scott on the ground that
the Due Process Clause protected the slaves as "persons" would,
even apart from the anomalies and difficulties which I have
touched upon, produce a different result from that produced by
an overruling of Dred Scott on the related ground that slaves
were not "property." The redefinition of "property," as we have
seen. would strip slave-owners of federal protection in the territories, restoring the status quo ante. The redefinition of "persons," however, would have the odd further effect of leaving intact Dred Scott's holding that the Missouri Compromise was
unconstitutional.
We are thus confronted, if not with a paradox, then with a
perplexing irony. Chief Justice Taney had been absolutely
right-in a sense-in Dred Scott. Taney was right that the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional. And, we must
add, all the old statutory "compromises" had been unconstitutional all along. This was not, as Taney thought, because the
Missouri compromise limited the rights of masters to keep slave
"property," but rather because in the Missouri Compromise (as
in every one of those old enactments), Congress had allowed for
slavery. In other words, Congress had tacitly but obviously authorized deprivations of the lives, liberty, and property of "persons." So overruling Dred Scott on our proffered ground would
have left all the old compromises as unconstitutional as they
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were after Dred Scott. In the end. then, Congress would remain
as powerless under the Fifth Amendment to effect any new
peaceful if temporising compromise as it was under Dred Scott.
There is a further. supreme irony in all of this. Even assuming the requisite judicial and political will to overrule Dred Scott,
and even setting to one side the legal and practical difficulties
confronting a Supreme Court desirous of doing so. overruling
Dred Scott could not have avoided the Civil War. In overruling
Dred Scott on the ground proposed in this essay. the Court.
ironically. would have left Congress as powerless as Chief Justice
Taney had left it to effect any further compromise of the sectional dispute. even if the country had not. in the acute crisis of
1860, passed the point of compromise. However importantly
Dred Scott may be presumed to have contributed to the coming of
the Civil War, overruling Dred Scott could not have averted it. We
discover. in this, one of the sad ironies of the American tragedy.
Could you and L contemplating the story of the compromises of the rights of "persons," compromises formed for the
high purpose of preserving the Union. have fallen into the same
moral trap as those antebellum Congresses that enacted them?
Why did we imagine, why do we still imagine. that diplomacy
and compromise are invariably right and good. when they may
be only expedient? How could James Madison have said that
"no blame should attach?" To the extent that extra127
constitutional means are sometimes truly necessary, we had
the excuse of our need. The Constitution of 1789 was marred by
the same need. Yet to the extent that the Bill of Rights reflects
American ideals, the course of compromise with slavery was always as unconstitutional as it was wrong.

VIII. CODA
In the end, of course, it was not the Court, but the Fourteenth Amendment that wrote finis to Dred Scott. It is true that
in 1862 Congress defied Dred Scott, outlawing slavery in the territories.12H But the constitutionality of that act of defiance would
remain unclear as long as Dred Scott stood. It was the Fourteenth Amendment that overrode Dred Scott, and did so in
. 1ar. 129
every part1cu
127. See infra note 129 on the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
128. See CURRIE. DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, supra note 113, at 1149-50.
129. Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by Southern states was largely coerced. Under the first Military Reconstruction Act. Congress ejected defined Southern
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In Dred Scott. Chief Justice Taney declared that black
Americans could never be citizens. 1"' But the Fourteenth
Amendment endows every person born or naturalized in America with the inestimable treasure of American citizenship. 131
In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney asserted that the black
man had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. 13"
But the Fourteenth Amendment says: Here they are. Those
rights include rights to life, liberty, and property, and no state
may deprive you of them without due process. They include the
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship, that no
state may abridge. And they include the right to equal protection of the laws, which no state may deny. 133
Dred Scott held that Congress had no power to limit the
134
rights of slave-masters. But the Fourteenth Amendment says
that Congress shall have power to enforce its terms. 135
Dred Scott relied on the view in Strader v. Graham that a
136
state could choose slave status for itself. But the Fourteenth
Amendment i~B?ses n_ational standards o~. the states, sayin_g,
"No state shall. · And It made all persons Citizens of the state m
which they reside. 13R
In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney insisted that slaves were
139
property. But the Fourteenth Amendment rejects that delusion when it provides that no compensation shall ever be paid by
state or nation on account of the loss or emancipation of a slave,
and that all debts and obligations on account of such loss shall be
140
void.
There may be other ways of reading the Fourteenth
Amendment, but, whatever its other aims, the Fourteenth
Amendment-and not the Supreme Court-did, finally, succeed
in overcoming Dred.

states and conditioned their readmission upon ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Act of Mar. 2. 1867. ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 249 (1867). Cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433 (1939) (holding the amendment process a nonjusticiable political question).
130. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1.
132. 60 U.S. at 407.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1.
134. 60 U.S. at 451.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 5.
136. 60 U.S. at 452.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1.
139. 60 U.S. at 410 & passim.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 4.

